What matters right now is not just that CRE loans are maturing. It is that a massive amount of debt is coming due at a time when refinancing has become more difficult, more expensive, and less predictable. According to the Mortgage Bankers Association, about $957 billion in commercial mortgage debt matured in 2025, and about $875 billion is scheduled to mature in 2026, equal to roughly 17% of the nearly $5 trillion in outstanding commercial mortgage debt.
While the 2026 total is slightly lower, the pressure has not dissipated. Many loans that typically would have refinanced already were instead extended or modified, pushing stress forward rather than resolving it. Higher borrowing costs, tighter underwriting, and weaker performance in some sectors continue to make refinancing harder.
In order for borrowers and investors to make smart decisions moving forward, we first need to understand what caused this debt maturity wall and how this cycle differs from prior ones.
What the Debt Maturity Wall Actually Is
In simple terms, the debt maturity wall is a large concentration of loans coming due in a short period, forcing many borrowers to refinance in the same market at the same time. Maturities are normal. The problem is concentration. When too many loans hit maturity during a period of higher rates and tighter credit, borrowers lose flexibility and refinancing risk rises.
This is also not one uniform wall. MBA reports that in 2026, about $396 billion of depository-held mortgages will mature, along with about $200 billion in CMBS, CLO, and other ABS loans, plus about $163 billion held by credit companies, warehouse lenders, and other lenders. By comparison, government-backed multifamily debt has a much smaller share maturing in the same year.
Refinance pressure varies by lender type, debt structure and asset class. Some properties may still refinance with relative ease, while others face immediate stress if income, occupancy, or value no longer support a new loan. So the maturity wall is not a single event hitting every borrower the same way. It is a broad refinance test with uneven outcomes across the market.
What Caused This Wall Historically
This wall was built during the low-rate years that followed the start of the COVID pandemic. In March 2020, the Federal Reserve cut the federal funds target range to 0 to 0.25%, helping create a lending environment with cheap debt, strong loan demand, and easier refinance assumptions. That made shorter-term loans, balloon structures, and more aggressive pricing easier to justify.
The problem is that many CRE loans depend on refinancing at maturity rather than full amortization. That works when debt stays affordable and capital remains available. It becomes a problem when those conditions change.
And they did. The Berkeley Haas paper The Writing on the Maturity Wall notes that the Fed raised rates 11 times in 2022 and 2023, moving from 0.0%-0.25% to 5.25%-5.50%. Borrowing costs rose, lender standards tightened, and borrowers who expected routine takeouts instead faced refinance gaps and lower proceeds.
This wall also grew because not all earlier maturities were resolved on schedule. Some loans that could not refinance cleanly in 2024 were pushed into 2025 and 2026 through extensions and modifications. Research shows that this kind of rollover pressure can weaken property performance before maturity arrives, including lower NOI, occupancy pressure, and reduced capital spending… which ultimately makes refinancing even harder down the road.
How This Cycle Compares to Other CRE Stress Cycles
This cycle is not the same as the post-2008 period. After the Global Financial Crisis, distress was driven more broadly by a breakdown in credit availability and banking-system stress. Today, capital still exists, but it is being deployed much more selectively. Lenders are active, but they are choosing deals more carefully, with far more attention on asset quality, sponsorship, cash flow, and exit clarity.
It is also different from the early COVID period. In 2020 and 2021, near-zero rates, policy support, and lender flexibility helped suppress immediate refinance pain. Today, those supports are gone. Borrowers are dealing with higher debt costs, more conservative underwriting, and in some cases lower asset values.
What makes this cycle especially important is that some of the pressure is structural, not just cyclical. That is most obvious in the office sector. Trepp reported that the office CMBS delinquency rate reached 12.34% in January 2026, while the overall CMBS delinquency rate rose to 7.47%. CREFC also noted that maturity defaults, not operating failures, remain the main driver of new distress. That means many assets are still functioning, but the loan structure no longer works in the current market.
This is less about universal market collapse and more about separation. Some assets remain financeable; some do not.
What Borrowers Should Do If They Are Part of This Wall
If you have a maturity coming due in the next 12 to 24 months, the first step is to re-underwrite the deal using today’s market assumptions. This requires testing your refinance models under current rates, current DSCR standards, and realistic valuation levels.
Borrowers also should not assume the current lender will automatically renew or extend. In this market it is important to put your best foot forward, even when engaging with your current lender. Financial statements, rent rolls, tenant profile, reserve position, trailing performance, and sponsor liquidity all need to be clean and current before the conversation becomes urgent.
Just as important, identify your fallback options early. Depending on the asset and capital stack, the right path may be an extension, restructure, recapitalization, equity injection, partial paydown, or sale. The key is to act early rather than waiting until maturity is too close. A refinance gap is much easier to solve when you still have time and leverage.
That is the practical lesson of this cycle: maturity exists regardless of how quickly you react to it. Your success depends on acting early.
Emerging Opportunities for Borrowers and Investors
Owners without near-term maturities may have more flexibility while others are forced to refinance, sell, or recapitalize. That can create openings for well-capitalized investors, borrowers, and lenders.
Some opportunities may come through acquisitions from stressed sellers. Others may come through recapitalizations, rescue capital, discounted payoffs, or partnership structures where an owner has a viable asset but an unworkable loan.
Selective lenders and debt funds may also benefit as weaker sponsors fall away and more deals require customized structures. Still, this is not a blanket distress wave. Opportunity will likely vary by property type, location, tenancy, sponsorship, and basis. In many cases, the best opportunity will come from solving maturity problems for others, not just buying distressed assets outright.
What This Means for the CRE Market Over the Next Few Years
The wall may be shrinking from 2025 to 2026, but the market is still facing a multi-year refinancing cycle, not a one-year headline. Many maturities still need to be worked through, and not all of them will be resolved through clean refinances.
That likely means continued segmentation across the market. Stronger assets with good sponsorship should continue to find debt, though not always on old terms. Weaker assets may face extensions, workouts, discounted sales, or capital restructuring. Office remains the clearest stress point, but the broader lesson applies across sectors: markets with tighter capital will force sharper distinctions between assets that deserve support and assets that do not.
Over the next few years, that should lead to more repricing, more lender selectivity, and more creativity in the capital stack. It should also increase the value of brokers and advisors who can solve refinance gaps rather than simply source loan quotes. In this cycle, structure matters as much as pricing.
Next Steps for Borrowers Facing 2026-2028 Maturities
For borrowers with maturities approaching over the next two years, the next step is simple. Review loan maturities now, not six months before payoff. Re-underwrite each deal under current market conditions. Determine early whether the likely path is refinance, extension, recapitalization, or sale.
Most importantly, talk with a broker or capital advisor before maturity pressure removes your negotiating leverage. The earlier you evaluate refinance options, valuation pressure, DSCR constraints, and fallback options, the more control you keep.
If your loan matures in the next 12 to 24 months, now is the time to pressure-test refinance options, identify any payoff gap, and build a strategy while there is still time to choose from multiple paths instead of reacting to a deadline. If you’d like support in the process, our team is here for you.
Sources:
Chen, Jiakai, and Yifan Chen. The Writing on the Maturity Wall: Commercial Real Estate Performance and Rollover Risk. Berkeley Haas, 2025. https://www.haas.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/The-Writing-on-the-MAturity-Wall.pdf
CRE Finance Council. CREFC’s January 2026 Monthly CMBS Loan Performance Report. CRE Finance Council, 2026. https://www.crefc.org/cre/content/News/Items/Research_and_Data/CREFCs_January_2026_Monthly_CMBS_Loan_Performance_Report.aspx
Federal Reserve. Federal Reserve Issues FOMC Statement. March 15, 2020. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20200315a.htm
Mortgage Bankers Association. Chart of the Week: Commercial Real Estate Loan Maturity Volumes. MBA Newslink, March 5, 2026. https://newslink.mba.org/cmf-newslinks/2026/march/mba-commercial-multifamily-newslink-thursday-march-5-2026/chart-of-the-week-commercial-real-estate-loan-maturity-volumes/
Trepp. CMBS Delinquency Rate Increased to Open 2026. Trepp, 2026. https://www.trepp.com/trepptalk/cmbs-delinquency-rate-increased-to-open-2026
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